Cuyahoga County, which contains Cleveland and 58 other municipalities, created a land bank in 2009 explicitly intended to acquire low-value properties, mitigate blighted housing, help stabilize neighborhoods, and slow the decline of property values. As of April 2012, the land bank had acquired 1,216 properties, had demolished 654 structures, and was maintaining 562 residences in its inventory with the intent of selling them to responsible owners. This paper evaluates the effectiveness of the land bank by estimating spatially-corrected hedonic price models using sales near the land-bank homes. Homes that sold within 500 feet of a property that would be acquired by the land bank in the next six months show a 3 to 5 percent discount versus observationally similar homes. Homes that sold within 500 feet of a land-bank-owned home sold at prices approximately 5 percent higher than similar homes. A land-bank demolition appears to have a positive externality, which adds 9 percent to the value of a nearby home sale. These results are consistent through a wide variety of specifi cations, but they are not measured precisely enough to be statistically signifi cant.
Introduction
With few exceptions, most large metropolitan areas have experienced decades of declining home values and abandonment of properties in central city neighborhoods and some inner suburbs. The foreclosure crisis and accompanying recession created an unprecedented wave of blighted properties in low-income neighborhoods of older US cities. Foreclosures, abandoned homes, and vacant lots have long been present in these neighborhoods, but the rapid unwinding of subprime mortgages caused a surge in distressed properties. Thousands of bank-owned homes were stripped of their valuable metals and damaged beyond repair.
Many of the foreclosed homes were sold to speculators who intended to resell them quickly at a profit. The speculators did little or no maintenance on the properties, especially if they did not reside in the area. When the speculators were unable to resell the properties, they abandoned them. These homes may endanger the neighbors and harbor criminals for months or years. Eventually, a tax foreclosure would place the properties in the hands of municipalities that do not have the resources to demolish the structures or maintain the lots.
By 2009, community leaders and elected officials concluded that dozens of neighborhoods in Cuyahoga County would be irreparably damaged if everyone waited for the private market to repurpose the properties. In many areas home and land values were extremely low, and the time when demand would rise again was in a distant, unpredictable future. To address this challenge, the Ohio General Assembly passed legislation to allow the creation of robust modern land banks. In contrast to the municipal land banks that have existed for decades, land banks created under SB353 possess enhanced acquisition powers, operational abilities, and a stable operating budget.
This analysis is the first attempt to empirically evaluate the effectiveness of a land bank created after the foreclosure crisis, with the enhanced powers mentioned above. We focus on the sale prices of homes nearby the land bank properties because the sale price quantifies the quality of life in a specific location. Home values are important to homeowners, property investors, mortgage holders, and all local governments that are supported by property taxes.
In our literature review, we only identified one previous empirical evaluation of a land bank.
Using spatially-corrected hedonic price models, we find that sales prices near houses that will soon be acquired by the land bank (within 6 months) are depressed by approximately 7 percent. In contrast, homes sold near land bank properties sell for more than observationally similar homes not near a land bank property. The results are quite consistent through over fifteen alternate specifications we attempt. However, the number of arms-length sales observed near land bank properties is still below 500. This results in imprecise estimates that are not statistically significant. Future replications of this evaluation will benefit from the ramping up of land bank activity and may solidify the promising results suggested by this analysis.
Background
From the perspective of state and local governments, abandoned, low-value housing would be ideally redeveloped by the private sector. But private redevelopment of abandoned property tends to occur only when the price of land exceeds the cost of acquisition and demolition of the structure (Rosenthal and Helsley, 1993) . Unfortunately, land values are extremely low in many areas where residential housing abandonment is common, resulting in little or no private redevelopment. This is the case in various neighborhoods in Cuyahoga County, Ohio, which are the areas covered by this study. In these census tracts, the median sale price of homes is half of that in other tracts in Cuyahoga County, and the poverty rate is two and a half times greater than that in other tracts. When land's salvage value is so low as to discourage redevelopment, community development practitioners report that abandonment spreads. The disamenity of an abandoned house encourages existing neighbors to move and discourages potential buyers from purchasing near the abandoned house. This creates a cycle that can be detrimental to neighborhoods: abandonment leads to nearby homes remaining vacant for prolonged periods, which may lead to further abandonment. The absence of private intervention in these markets has encouraged public officials to increase public demolition or rehabilitation of abandoned residential property.
One of the tools being used to mitigate blighted residential properties is modern land banking. Ohio's modern land banks are government-incorporated nonprofit entities with statutorily defined missions to acquire nonproductive real property and return it to productive use (Fitzpatrick IV, 2010 property-tax foreclosure and directly from lenders foreclosing on mortgages. When acquiring properties through tax-foreclosure, the Cuyahoga land bank notifies public authorities of its interest in acquiring the property, and if the city in which the property is located allows it, the Cuyahoga land bank receives the property after foreclosure. Most of the properties the land bank acquires come directly from foreclosing lenders, rather than through tax-foreclosure.
Individual lenders have entered agreements with the Cuyahoga land bank such that any property they foreclose upon valued below a certain amount (usually $20,000 to $30,000)
is donated or sold to the Cuyahoga land bank for a nominal sum. The lenders frequently include a contribution to cover part of the cost of demolishing the home, when demolition is necessary.
Once the Cuyahoga land bank has the property in inventory, it inspects the property and determines if it is a candidate for rehabilitation or demolition based on the property's condition and the strength of the local housing market. If it is possible to rehabilitate it, the land bank will usually market the property to private rehabbers. If there is no interest in rehabbing the property in the first six or so months, the property will be slated for demolition. Most of the properties acquired by the Cuyahoga land bank will eventually be demolished.
Land banks will very likely proliferate in the coming years in most cities in the industrial Midwest and Northeast. This is because they are the best vehicle for policy makers to address the consequences of excess housing stock. Excess housing arises when the number of households is stagnant or declining, but new housing construction continues. If growth of a region's housing stock exceeds the growth of its population, prices will adjust until the most desirable homes are filled (Bier and Post, 2003; Glaeser and Gyourko, 2005) . The oldest, lowest quality homes are filtered out of the stock by being left vacant and eventually demolished or abandoned (Lowry, 1960) . Most new housing in the US is built on the periphery of urbanized areas, and the oldest homes are concentrated in the center of the central cities.
The innermost census tracts often have declining populations even when the metropolitan population is growing.
Cities across the country have long perceived abandoned residential housing as a problem (Accordino and Johnson, 2000) . The problem is particularly acute in older industrial cities that have lost population in and around their urban cores (Mallach, 2012 (Immergluck and Smith, 2006; Schuetz et al., 2008; Leonard and Murdoch, 2009; Harding et al., 2009; Rogers and Winter, 2009; Hartley, 2010; Rogers, 2010; Campbell et al., 2011; Groves and Rogers, 2011 
Empirical Methods
The methods we will employ are based in the field of hedonic models of real estate pricing.
Origination of these models is generally credited to Rosen (1974) . In their simplest application, the sales price of a home is regressed on indicators of the home's characteristics, and the coefficients are interpreted as the marginal prices of those characteristics. Most applications employ a semi-log specification that implicitly interacts all the characteristic measures because a home's value is determined by the features it bundles together. Additional rooms or fireplaces cannot be sold off at their own prices. In this specification, the coefficients are not interpreted as prices, but rather percentage changes in the price.
Despite including a set of measures of the area surrounding an observed house sale, researchers generally suspect that there are important unobserved location factors. These include amenities and disamenities the researchers have not controlled for. The possibilities are endless, including amenities such as parks, transit stops, or convenient shopping, and disamenities such as heavy industry or traffic noise. The impact of these factors is also thought to vary with distance: a home closer to the amenity or disamenity will have a larger price response. Omitting a distance-weighted indicator of the factor leaves its influence in the error term. Equation 1 is a hedonic price model that gives two options to address this (Anselin, 1988) .
W 1 is a spatial weighting matrix that gives large weight to the prices of nearby homes and small weight to the prices of faraway homes. Multiplying the price vector (P ) by W 1 creates a vector of weighted averages of nearby home prices. These nearby home prices contain information about all the local amenities and disamenities that cannot be measured. Including these averages as a control removes the gradient between relatively high-price, high-amenity tracts and low-price, low-amenity tracts. The remaining variation within neighborhoods tells us approximately how much sale prices would change if we could add or remove distressed
properties. The parameter λ relates the distance-weighted mean selling price of the other homes to the specific observation. If λ is significant and non-zero, the prices are said to be spatially dependent. W 2 is also a distance weighting, but in this case relating the errors of the observations to one another through ρ. A non-zero ρ indicates spatial error correlation, which would be caused by unobserved amenities and disamenities contributing to the error terms of nearby homes. The error term µ is the normal error remaining after the spatial error has been modeled. Unfortunately, ρ, λ, W 1 , and W 2 cannot all be estimated at once, so researchers usually make some plausible assumption about either the spatial weight matrices or the spatial autocorrelation coefficients, and estimate the other. We will refer to the correction involving W 1 as the spatial-lag correction and the correction employing W 2 as the spatial-error correction.
In specifying the spatial models, we use a weight matrix based on the inverse of the distances to the ten closest sales. Closer sales are given larger weights and further homes are down-weighted. In the robustness checks, several other spatial corrections are attempted.
Spatial-error and spatial-lag models are often estimated using maximum likelihood routines.
Kalajian and Prucha demonstrated that if there is heteroskedasticity in the data (as is common in regional housing price models), maximum likelihood estimates contain bias (1999).
They propose a generalized method of moments estimator for ρ which addresses this bias.
The main results we present are estimated with a spatial-error GMM procedure.
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Two additional concerns are raised in the literature and should be kept in mind when considering this analysis. The causality between distressed properties and falling home prices can run in both directions. When home prices are falling, households in economic distress may not be able to sell their home and downsize or shift to renting. If the recent price downturn has been severe, or if the homeowner put little money down on the home, they may owe more than the home could sell for. Even if they can sell the home, they cannot repay the mortgage unless they have other assets. In this situation, the homeowner has no option except to allow the home to go into foreclosure. If a housing market is in the self-reinforcing cycle of falling prices and increasing distressed properties, these trends will introduce bias, overstating the externality of distressed homes.
If a simultaneous equation mirroring equation 1 was specified with distressed properties as the left hand side, price levels or price trends could be on the right hand side. Also, the error terms of the price and distressed property equations could be correlated if a confounding factor, such as job losses in the region, is not included in the model. To address this possible source of bias, we calculate a trimmed (10th percentile through 90th) average sale price in each census tract in [2005] [2006] and in the 24 months preceding each sale. We create a trend variable relating these two values. 4 We include the trend measure in all the models presented in the results. The trend variable represents how far the neighborhood has fallen since the region's price peak. The greater the decline, the greater likelihood that homes are underwater and foreclosures will be elevated. Larger declines should also motivate buyers to demand a discount to compensate them for their expected loss of equity if the trend continues. If there is an endogeneity bias on the estimated negative impact of the distressed properties, the inclusion of the price trend should help to remove it.
Over the eighteen months in our data, home prices in the county declined by approximately 4.5 percent. From the beginning to the end of the period, the counts of land bank properties near sold homes were increasing simply because the land bank was expanding its operations. The trends of falling prices and rising land bank inventory could bias the externality estimates downward. It is important to remember that increasing land bank inventories is distinct from increasing distressed properties. The county-wide incidence of vacancy and tax delinquency was quite steady, with roughly equal counts of homes moving into and out of these statuses. The count of recent foreclosures in the county continued a steady decline from a peak of 8,757 in 2008. In April 2010, we can identify 4,491 recent foreclosures in the data and by October 2011, we observe 3,934. Of course, important trends could be at work in smaller geographies, so we include the tract-level price trend to control for this. We also include indicators for the month of sale in all estimates. These indicators are intended to adjust for the strong seasonality in northern real estate markets, but they could also capture a secular trend.
Another estimation issue involves the selection of home sales into our data set. If homes are held off the market by owners hoping for a price recovery, we will not observe their sale prices. If withholding of homes is more frequent near distressed properties, then this could lead to an underestimate of the impact of the distressed properties on neighboring property values. Lin, Rosenblatt, and Yao specified a model that estimates the selection into a sale and the implied change in the coefficient on the foreclosure count (2009). They find evidence that homes near foreclosures are more likely to be held in the shadow inventory, but the effect on estimates of a foreclosure's impact is too small to be of great concern.
Data
Our data on the land bank properties is derived directly from the comprehensive administrative database maintained by the Cuyahoga land bank. Every property is tracked by parcel number from its initial review before acquisition through its acquisition and rehabilitation or demolition. This allows us to precisely place the land bank properties of various statuses in the 500 foot buffers around the observed sales. The land bank data cover all properties touched from the inception of the land bank through April 2012. When we estimate models incorporating counts of properties that will eventually be acquired by the land bank, we have to exclude more recent sales because they may have future land bank properties nearby that
we cannot yet identify.
To supplement our data on land bank activities, we sought data on all other demolitions in the county since the land bank began operations. We contacted all 59 municipalities in the county and requested the parcel number and dates of demolitions since 2009. We also obtained records on the Neighborhood Stabilization Program funded demolitions and requests for demolition permits. Not surprisingly, there is great variety in the details tracked and the methods used to record demolitions across the county. Unlike the land bank records, which record the specific day a demolition is complete, the city records sometimes do not have the exact date of the demolition. If that date was not available, we used an inspection date, which is the day the city inspector visits the site to confirm the demolition was safely completed (debris is removed, basement is filled, etc.). If an inspection date was not available, we used the date the demolition permit was requested. Our use of a constructed "best demo date available" measure will involve measurement error, but we expect it is still informative about the location of blighted properties and newly-vacated lots. A demolition conducted by the land bank or any other entity will create a vacant residential lot. New construction on these lots is very rare under current market conditions. Also, it is important to recognize that vacant lots have been accumulating in the county's low-income areas for decades. To control for the pre-existing amenity or disamenity of these empty lots, we identified them and counted them within the 500 foot buffers in the same way we counted the land bank properties. We created an indicator for the parcel being empty if the the tax assessors' record shows that the parcel is zoned residential but has a building value of $0.
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The sales and property characteristic measures are from Cuyahoga County administrative data sets maintained to track property transactions, property-tax delinquency, and assessed values for taxation. The records include a rich set of property characteristics which are used in property tax assessments and are updated triennially and with permit data. The county fiscal officer also maintains records of all sales with the key elements of dollar amount, date, seller, and purchaser. Using this sales data, we identify the month in which properties sold at a sheriff's sale (occurring at the tail end of the foreclosure process). We count any property that has sold via sheriff's sale in the previous 12 months as foreclosed.
The sales data goes back to 2008 and earlier, allowing us to accurately identify foreclosed properties from before this study's time period. We use three tax-delinquency files. These 5 Tax exempt building values are recorded, so these are not misrepresented as empty lots. Cuyahoga County has been built-out for some time, so vacant residential land is almost always the result of demolition rather than recent rezoning of agricultural land.
6 If a property owner requests a permit to add an addition on their house, for example, the assessor will estimate the increase in the home's value and adjust the property tax bill accordingly. We have attempted to exclude non-arms-length sales, starting by excluding sales involving personal trusts and spouses. We exclude bulk purchases, where the price paid for a bundle of properties is recorded for each property in the transaction. In these cases, it is not clear what portion of the total prices should be related to the individual properties. We exclude sheriff sales in which a bank or federal agency repurchases a home on which it holds the mortgage.
These prices reflect the lender's auction reserve rather than the market value of the home.
The sales data are limited to single family homes. Multifamily buildings are counted in the vacancy, delinquency, and foreclosure counts. Buildings add zero or one to the counts, regardless of how many units they have. A multi-family building is considered vacant if less than 25 percent of its units are occupied. For tax-delinquency, apartments generally pay taxes via one parcel number, and are thus clearly current or delinquent. Condominiums units pay taxes via individual parcels. We have grouped by them by their association address and counted the address tax-delinquent if more than 75 percent of the units are tax-delinquent. Table 1 provides a few descriptive statistics for the main outcome and independent variables of interest. The Cleveland metropolitan area is a low-cost housing market, and the land bank operates in the submarkets that have lower demand than the rest of region. Among the sales that were in census tracts treated by any land bank property or other demolition, the median sale price was $75,000, and the mean sale price was $93,851. The mean count of land bank properties within 500 feet of a sale is between 0.02 and 0.04, depending on the status. This implies that more than nine out of ten property sales have no land bank We will conduct the analysis using only sales in tracts that have at least one sale near a land bank property or recent demolition. As demonstrated in Whitaker and Fitzpatrick, high poverty neighborhoods price distressed property very differently than low-poverty neighborhoods (2011). Pooling all sales could result in misleading estimates. Table 2 illustrates that the areas where the land bank operates are very different from those where demand is high enough that the land bank is not needed. Home prices are approximately twice as high in areas with no land bank activity of recent demolitions. Poverty rates are over twice as high. The housing stock in treated tracts is mostly pre-War while that in untreated tracks is mostly post-War. The larger lots, second bathrooms and central air reflect this.
Descriptive Statistics

Results
Main Results
The set of models reported in table 3 begins with the acquired and demolished land bank properties treated like any other amenity or disamenity in a hedonic price model. In Model I, both types of properties have positive coefficients, but neither is significant. If these coefficients represent the true externality, the land bank's demolition or maintenance of the properties must be sending an encouraing signal to buyers about the stabilization of the immediate neighborhood. Model II adds in the count of pre-land bank properties. The observations must be limited to those before October 2011, because October is the last month in which pre-land bank properties can be accurately identified. Pre-land bank properties are estimated to have a large negative externality, taking five percent off of the sale price of nearby homes. However, this impact is not precisely measured, and we cannot say it is significantly different from zero. When the most recent six months are removed, the period of rapid expansion of the land bank's inventory is not captured.
In model III in table 3, we add the counts of properties that will soon be demolished by anyone other than the land bank. The coefficient suggests a negative externality from these properties, but the evidence is not conclusive. The count of vacant lots, which includes both recent demolitions and lots that have been vacant for years or decades, has a negative impact of 1.7 percent on the sale price of nearby homes. This impact is far more common, more precisely measured, and statistically significant. Models IV through VII introduce other counts of distressed properties. The model estimate of the negative externality of foreclosures is -.026, but the count of delinquent properties appears to have even more explanatory power. 
When the count of vacant homes is introduced in
Alternate Specifications
Having not found the estimated externalities of the land bank properties to be significant, we attempted nine alternate specifications to see if the pattern of the coefficients persisted.
Eight of the nine models are variations of Model VII in table 3 and they are performed on the 6,699 sales between April 2010 and October 2011. The "All Tracts" model is estimated with data from the same dates, but including sales in census tracts with no land bank or demolition activity. In the models without a spatial correction or with tract fixed effects rather than a spatial error structure, the coefficients on the land bank counts are essentially unchanged. If city fixed effects are introduced, the count of pre-land bank properties achieves marginal significance (10 percent level), and the coefficients of the acquired and demolished properties are reduced in magnitude.
The second table of alternate specifications (Table 5) presents results from a model including both spatial lag and spatial error corrections. It also presents estimates from maximum-likelihood specifications with spatial lags and spatial error structures. None of these substantially differ from the GMM spatial error specification (Table 3 , Model VII).
Omitting the trend variable from the model increases the coefficient on the pre land bank property count, and eliminates the positive coefficient on the count of nearby land bank acquired homes (see table 6 ). Without the trend control, the estimates may be biased by an endogenous relationship of the land bank properties and falling prices. Adding in sales from census tracts with no-land bank or demolition activity decreases the coefficients on the pre-land bank and acquired properties. None of the coefficients of interest become significant, despite the increased sample size.
Policy Implications
Here we will make a rough estimate of the value saved or created by the land bank. If the land bank did not exist, the positive externality from having the land bank maintain the house or lot nearby the sold home would not exist. Likewise, the blighted properties would continue to exist and to exert their negative externality on the homes for sale. We take each sale and multiply its counts of acquired and demolished homes by the coefficients from Model 
Conclusions
Although we are unable to provide definitive evidence of a positive impact of the Cuyahoga land bank on nearby property values, this analysis provides encouraging prospects. Homes that sell near land bank properties appear to sell for approximately 4 to 9 percent more than similar homes not near a land bank property. This is in contrast to the negative 5 to 7 percent externality realized by homes that sell near land bank homes before the land bank owns them. Likewise, vacant lots display a smaller negative externality than other distressed properties (tax delinquent recent foreclosures, non-land bank imminent demolitions). This analysis will have to be revisited so additional observed sales can increase the precision of all the estimates.
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